

Naval War College Review

Volume 48
Number 1 *Winter*

Article 7

1995

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Recommended Citation

Hamilton, Charles D. (1995) "From Archidamus to Alexander: The Revolution in Greek Warfare," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 48 : No. 1 , Article 7.
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From Archidamus to Alexander

The Revolution in Greek Warfare

Charles D. Hamilton

WHEN ALEXANDER THE GREAT CROSSED the Hellespont to launch his invasion of the Persian Empire in 334 B.C., he commanded an army of some forty thousand troops of mixed type.¹ He relied upon the Macedonian phalanx of heavy infantry, which his father had perfected, but he also employed both light and heavy cavalry, *peltasts* (light-armed infantry), skirmishers, archers and slingers, and other specialized troops. The soldiers themselves consisted of Macedonian citizens, allied Greek troops, and Greek mercenaries. By contrast, the army that the Spartan king Archidamus commanded in his invasion of Attica almost a century earlier, during the Peloponnesian War, consisted primarily of citizen-soldiers from Sparta and allied states. In short, Alexander's army was quite different in composition, organization, and diversity from the traditional armies of classical Greece. This factor surely counted for much in Alexander's amazing success in conquering Persia, although the generalship of the king himself was also obviously crucial. While recognizing that the army of Alexander differed from those of the previous century, scholars have not generally tried to demonstrate how the changes came about. It is the purpose of this article to discuss several key developments of the early fourth century—the period between the Peloponnesian War and the rise of Macedon—that led to the type of army that Alexander commanded.

As it evolved in the Archaic Age and continued down into the sixth and fifth century B.C., Greek warfare came to be conducted in an almost ritualized fashion.² Infantry battles tended to be set-pieces in which phalanxes faced off

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against one another while cavalry and light-armed infantry units served as scouts or skirmishers or to protect the flanks of the heavy infantry. The combatants were almost universally citizen-soldiers, *hoplites*, who possessed sufficient wealth to equip themselves with the full panoply of armor, including expensive metal helmet, breastplate, spear, shield, and sword. With rare exceptions, such as in Sparta, these hoplites were not professional soldiers but rather served as a militia called out to protect their land and homes when danger threatened, as for example in the Persian invasion of 480.³ Warfare was often of rather short duration; campaigns were brief and usually confined to the spring and summer months. Frequently the Greek citizen army was in the field for only a matter of weeks, and decisive battles were often conducted in the course of a day.

In a typical hoplite engagement, the opposing armies were drawn up in battle formation on a level plain. Tactics were straightforward; each force arranged its heavy-armed infantry in a phalanx or densely packed mass in which the first ranks often stretched for hundreds of yards across the battlefield and the files were eight or twelve men deep. The two phalanxes advanced rapidly toward one another until the front ranks clashed in combat. In the ensuing melee, if a gap was opened in one phalanx, the enemy would attempt to drive a wedge into it in order to exploit the opportunity; the broken phalanx would usually try to withdraw from the field, maintaining order as best it could. Although casualties could be severe, wholesale massacres rarely occurred; these happened only if the retreating phalanx broke completely and the enemy pursued and cut down the troops fleeing in panic. A request to recover the bodies of the dead and wounded was an admission of defeat; the victorious army, in possession of the field, usually stripped the dead of valuable arms before allowing them to be taken away for burial. The victors erected a temporary memorial on the battlefield, consisting of captured armor draped on a post or tree trunk and called a *tropaion*, or trophy; often a simple stone inscription replaced this monument later on. Such was warfare in classical Greece.

However, changes in tactics had already begun to occur in the course of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 B.C.), with the rise of the peltasts and the use of fortified posts from which garrison troops could launch frequent raids into enemy territory and to which they could return in safety.⁴ Furthermore, increasing reliance on mercenary troops and a growing duration of campaigns had serious implications in the socio-economic realm. Mercenaries, by definition, serve for pay; as Greek states turned more and more to them, that pay became an ever more significant element in state finances. Over the four decades from about 400 to 360, the character of Greek warfare changed in dramatic ways. The achievements of several commanders whose careers spanned these decades—the Spartan king Agesilaus, the Athenian mercenary Iphicrates, and the Theban


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generals Pelopidas and Epaminondas—illustrate these changes, and they form the focus of this analysis.

Following its victory over Athens in the long and bitter Peloponnesian War, Sparta dominated Greece for more than thirty years, with Agesilaus ruling for most of this period. His earliest campaigns were waged in Asia Minor on behalf of the Ionian Greeks against the Persian king. Agesilaus next fought during the Corinthian War in Greece against the anti-Spartan coalition of Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos. The middle years of his reign saw him campaigning against the Thebans in defense of the old Spartan order in the Peloponnesus, and his last years were spent as a hired mercenary commander fighting in Egypt on behalf of native dynasts in rebellion against Persia. Throughout the vicissitudes of a long and varied career, Agesilaus experienced and reacted to the political, military, and socio-economic changes that were shaping the fourth-century Greek states.⁵

Agesilaus was the first Spartan king to command mercenary armies as well as the more traditional levies of Spartan troops and Peloponnesian allies.⁶ He could never take for granted the loyalty and devotion of his troops; rather, he had to cultivate their dedication to him and work at maintaining their morale.⁷ This situation contrasted sharply with that of earlier Spartan commanders. The absolute obedience and loyalty, for instance, of the three hundred Spartiates (the elite class of Spartan citizens possessing full political rights) who had stood and fallen with King Leonidas at Thermopylae—quite apart from their glorification by Herodotus—had been typical of citizen hoplites. Spartan commanders had taken it as axiomatic that their troops would exhibit unquestioning bravery and immediate compliance with orders.⁸ In his first command, by contrast, Agesilaus led a very mixed force, consisting of *neodamodeis* (liberated *helots*, or Spartan serfs), Peloponnesian allies, Greek mercenaries, and levies of Aeolic and Ionian Greeks recruited from the local cities.⁹ Agesilaus managed to win the respect and loyalty of this motley array through a combination of personal traits and apparent concern for his troops. His demeanor allowed his troops to view him as one of themselves.¹⁰

Agesilaus did in fact care about his troops. On numerous campaigns, Agesilaus made it a point to allow them to profit from the pillaging that was so much a part of his military activity.¹¹ At the same time, however, Agesilaus provided adequate provisions for his men from more conventional sources, and he appears to have been just as concerned with this aspect of his role as with providing opportunities for plunder.¹² In sum, his openness and lack of arrogance, as well as his personal solicitude for the conditions of his army, made him popular and well liked, a man who could command the respect and affection of his troops. A positive rapport between a commander and his troops, however, is hardly



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enough to qualify him as an effective general; much more is needed. Once assured of the loyalty and fighting spirit of his troops, the commander must know, among many other things, how to position them to best advantage in battle.

While Agesilaus engaged in several battles of the classic hoplite type, particularly at Coroneia in 394 and again at Mantinea in 362, he spent the major portion of his active campaigning in raiding, skirmishing, and similar "new style" fighting. Doing so necessitated adaptation to new tactics; Agesilaus showed that

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he was quite skillful and resourceful in responding to the challenges of his age. For example, when he realized that because he lacked adequate cavalry he was at a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis the Persians in his campaigns in Asia Minor, he stimulated the local Greeks to raise a mounted force. The richest men in the districts subject to him were assigned responsibility for providing the horses, and they were exempted from serving themselves if they paid the wages of trained riders. Further, by offering prizes and awards for the most skillful men and the most effective units, Agesilaus not only created a new force to fill an important need but also sharpened its combat abilities.¹³ He made effective use of his new cavalry in ravaging enemy territory during the year 395, and it played a decisive role in the battle of Sardis in that year.

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In the Asia Minor campaign Agesilaus also manifested a high degree of skill in the use of ambushes, feints, and diversionary tactics to meet the conditions in which he operated.¹⁴ Crossing from Hellespontine Phrygia to Mysia, for instance, he encountered treachery on the part of the inhabitants, with whom he had attempted to negotiate passage of a narrow defile. He responded by laying an ambush, feigning a retreat, and drawing the hostile natives into a trap that cost them dearly and led them to seek terms.¹⁵ It seems quite clear that he was adept at adjusting his tactics to both terrain and circumstances. The feint or diversion that worked so well in Asia Minor was a tactic that Agesilaus repeated, with variations, during the Corinthian War.

The principal area of tactics in which he proved deficient, however, was that of siegecraft. He made several futile attempts in Asia Minor to take fortified towns.¹⁶ Similarly, in Greece proper, he proved unable to lay siege successfully to Corinth in the 390s and Thebes in the 370s. It would be difficult therefore to argue that Agesilaus exhibited a greater degree of technical ability in the matter of siegecraft than did his contemporaries. (On the other hand, few commanders in classical Greece were able to take a well fortified town either by storm or through siege. The skill of Alexander the Great in siegecraft—often underrated—should be viewed as extraordinary in that age. For that matter, however, even Alexander took almost eight months to reduce Tyre, while the expertise of his successor Demetrius in such tactics was still rare enough at the end of the fourth century to earn him a nickname—"Poliorcetes," Taker of Cities.)¹⁷

On balance, therefore, it would seem that Agesilaus exhibited skill, insight, and adaptability in meeting new military situations demanding tactical innovation; he was at least the equal of most of his contemporaries. Two exceptions come to mind: the Athenian Iphicrates, who developed peltast tactics, and the Theban generals Pelopidas and Epaminondas, who refined traditional hoplite tactics by massing strength on one wing of the phalanx.¹⁸ Their achievements deserve notice, and we shall consider them now, beginning with the Athenian. In them we find additional evidence for the transformation of warfare.

Iphicrates came to prominence in the 390s as a young officer especially skilled in training and employing light-armed troops, peltasts. During the course of his long career, he introduced several changes in their equipment for which he became famous.¹⁹ Peltasts normally used a light throwing javelin instead of the long thrusting pike of the hoplite, and they were more lightly armored.²⁰ They carried the *pelta*, an oblong shield smaller than the large, heavy, round *aspis* of the hoplite. The great advantages of peltasts were their mobility and speed; they had been used accordingly as skirmishers, scouts, and harassing troops long before the Corinthian War.²¹ Iphicrates seems to have improved their equipment by introducing a heavier javelin that caused more damage; he also devised a modification of the men's boot (called the "Iphicratid") for greater ease of movement.²² Iphicrates' tactic was to send his peltasts well within a javelin's throw of the enemy formation to launch their missiles; apparently even a well trained phalanx could not escape serious disruption from the rain of heavy spears. Then, before the slower and more cumbersome formation could close with the more lightly protected peltasts, the latter would run off. This tactic produced frightful results against several of Sparta's allies.²³ The Spartans were initially scornful, attributing its success to the cowardice of their allies, but they were soon to see that even Spartans could not stand against peltasts.

In 390, the Spartans were in possession of Corinth's port, Lechaion. Among their forces was a contingent from Amyclae, whose custom it was to march back home when the festival of the Hyacinthia was to be celebrated. The Spartan commander sent a cavalry detachment and a full Spartan regiment to accompany the Amyclaeans until they were a safe distance away from the enemy, who lay in Corinth. Four or five miles from Corinth the Spartan regiment turned back, leaving the cavalry to escort the Amyclaeans to Sparta. Seeing the Spartan infantry returning without cavalry accompaniment, Iphicrates and the Athenian hoplite commander, Callias, decided to attack them. The plan was for Callias to draw up his phalanx outside the walls to offer the peltasts protection while they applied their hit-and-run tactics and then to cover their retreat. Iphicrates ordered his own men to advance to within javelin range of the Spartan phalanx, hurl their weapons, and withdraw on the double. The Spartan commander,

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seeing some of his men struck, ordered the soldiers in the twenty-to-thirty age group, a detachment of young and vigorous warriors, to rush forward against the peltasts and drive them off. This they attempted, but they were unable to catch up with the peltasts, and during their retreat to the Spartan phalanx they were struck with more missiles and suffered even greater casualties. This cycle was repeated several times; more and more Spartans were hit, until near-panic set in. Now the Athenian hoplites advanced against the remaining Spartans, who withdrew to a small hill on the coast some two miles from Lechaion. The defenders of that city set out in boats to their rescue, but the majority of the soldiers perished, either by Athenian arms or by drowning as they tried to swim to safety. The result was virtual annihilation of this regiment as a fighting force and a crushing blow to Spartan prestige and pride in arms.²⁴ Iphicrates went on to a long career as a mercenary commander, as often in the service of Persians and Egyptians as of Greeks. By combining appropriate new types of equipment with innovative tactics, Iphicrates had dramatically changed the patterns of land combat, with corresponding consequences for state power.

The Spartans ended the Corinthian War in 387 B.C. through negotiation with Persia; a Spartan victory over their enemies in mainland Greece was bought at the price of surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to Persian control. During the ensuing period of Spartan supremacy in Greece proper—in the face of growing opposition by Thebes, Athens, and other states—King Agesilaus limited his role largely to the political rather than the military sphere. Although he was clearly responsible for the political and diplomatic scenario that would result in the Spartan disaster at Leuctra in 371, fortunately for him it was the other Spartan king, Cleombrotus, who actually led the Spartiates to catastrophe at the hands of a newly reorganized Theban army under Pelopidas and Epaminondas.²⁵

Leuctra was one of those battles that changed history. Much depended on its outcome, particularly for the respective commanders. Epaminondas and his fellow *Boeotarchs* (Boeotian officials who served as military commanders) felt that to refuse to fight the Spartans even against the odds might have meant the end of their control of Boeotia, the fall of Thebes, and the dissolution of everything they had struggled for since the liberation of their city from Sparta in 379 B.C.²⁶ As for the Spartans, King Cleombrotus himself was beset by political problems. His friends urged him to engage the enemy lest he be tried and exiled upon his return to Sparta, while his political foes waited to see if he really was, as had been suspected, pro-Theban in his sympathies.²⁷ Cleombrotus's force appears to have outnumbered the Boeotians, the level plain at Leuctra provided classic terrain for a hoplite encounter, and he had been ordered by his government to engage the enemy; thus the scene was set for the battle, and the Spartans anticipated victory.

The basic orders of battle of the two sides at Leuctra are clear enough. In the Spartan army, the Lacedaemonians themselves held the right wing and their allies the left, in accord with the normal Spartan deployment. The four Spartan regiments were drawn up "not more than twelve deep," as Xenophon says. The king, with the *hippeis*, or royal bodyguard, was probably positioned between the first and second regiments from the right. In the opposing Boeotian army, the Thebans held the left wing, opposite the Spartans, with their Boeotian allies on the right facing the Spartan allies.²⁸ The Thebans were massed "not less than fifty deep";²⁹ the sheer weight of such a column was designed to crush the enemy line and carry all before it. Apparently Epaminondas positioned his smaller force

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such that it would engage the Spartan line at the point where King Cleombrotus and his guard stood, for it was there that the fiercest fighting was and the greatest losses for the Spartans occurred. Plutarch makes clear the important role of the Theban Sacred Band, a highly trained group of three hundred semi-professional troops, under Pelopidas, and it is likely that those elite troops formed the first several ranks of the Theban hoplite line, literally its "cutting edge."³⁰

The engagement opened with a cavalry action. Xenophon says that since the ground was level there, the Spartans deployed their cavalry in front of their phalanx.³¹ Normally in Greek warfare, cavalry served as scouts, to identify enemy positions, or as auxiliary troops, to protect the flanks from enemy movements and occasionally to pursue fleeing troops. In either case they were stationed behind or beside the phalanx, rarely in front of it; thus we must wonder why in this case the cavalry was positioned there. The Boeotian cavalry also operated in front of their phalanx, and they closed with the Spartans. The Spartan horse was not up to grade—the mounts belonged to the rich, and the riders were hired and not very well trained. The Theban cavalry, on the contrary, had been given a good deal of practice and was in superb condition. As a result, the Thebans drove the Spartan horse back; many of the Spartan cavalrymen fled into their own lines, disrupting the hoplite phalanx. Those who could, retreated to the rear through a gap that had opened in the line between the Spartans and their allies on the left.³²

It appears that Cleombrotus had ordered his mounted troops to operate in front of the phalanx in order to screen a movement that he had directed upon realizing that the Theban phalanx directly in his front was a very deep one.³³ The Theban general had moved his phalanx forward in oblique fashion, toward his

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left, in order to draw the Spartans away as far as possible from their allies on their own left and to produce thereby a gap in their phalanx. Cleombrotus, distracted by the dust raised by the cavalry and the confused action of the horsemen, attempted to respond to Epaminondas's advance; it was through the resulting gap that some of the Spartan horse escaped. Cleombrotus, perceiving the Theban intention, now decided to wheel part of his line around behind his phalanx to encircle the enemy's left flank. It was at this juncture, while units from the left of the Spartan portion of the line were moving toward the rear in the flanking movement, that Pelopidas saw his opportunity: he dashed forward with the Sacred Band.³⁴ Pelopidas caught Cleombrotus by surprise while the Spartan line was disordered, and bitter fighting developed. Before long the king himself fell, and he was carried off the field to die.³⁵

The Thebans literally swept the field. On the other flank there was little action, neither the Boeotian nor Spartan allies having much appetite for battle. The Spartans eventually gave way and retreated, but in good order, to their camp, which was protected by a small ditch. Epaminondas did not pursue but waited until the next day to see what the enemy would do.³⁶ After King Cleombrotus's death, the *polemarchs*, the Spartan regimental commanders, took counsel about the best course of action. Some urged a return to battle, but others noted not only their severe losses but also that their own allies were not displeased with how things had gone and probably could not be counted upon to fight loyally. The Spartan polemarchs therefore sent heralds to take up the dead under truce, thus signalling their acceptance of defeat. Epaminondas insisted that the Spartan allies collect their dead first, so that the number of Spartan dead would be apparent to all.

As it turned out, about a thousand Lacedaemonians had been slain, including four hundred of the seven hundred Spartiates present.³⁷ The Thebans may have lost as many as three hundred, but their victory was undeniable;³⁸ although it was not immediately apparent, Leuctra was the beginning of the end of the Spartan hegemony. Within the next year the Thebans were to invade the Peloponnesus and liberate Messenia from Spartan control, thus upsetting the political balance of power that had prevailed for three centuries. The Thebans had outgeneralled the Spartans, and they would go on to dominate Greece for a decade, until the rise of Philip of Macedon after 360.

These three glimpses of the early fourth century B.C. indicate elements of the changing nature of Greek warfare in those years: the need for commanders to adapt to new tactical situations; the rise of a new type of soldier, the mercenary who fought as a peltast, in place of the citizen hoplite; and the increasing employment of cavalry. In the decades that followed Leuctra, the balance of power shifted until Philip's defeat of the Greek coalition at Chaeroneia in 338. In these years, as well as those that witnessed Alexander's conquest of the Persian

empire, military changes continued. Cavalry in particular, with new tactics, became a much more significant element in warfare, and siege operations also became more important.

The position of *strategos*, general, was brought to a peak of skill by Alexander; he, however, had precedents in Agesilaus, Iphicrates, Pelopidas, and Epaminondas. They demonstrated adaptability to new tactics made possible by technological change. Alexander's army of 334 B.C. bore little resemblance in its composition or its tactics to the force Archidamus had led into Attica nearly one hundred years earlier; significant social, economic and political shifts in the interim had been matched by corresponding military innovation.

Notes

1. See J.F.C. Fuller, *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1960); P. Green, *Alexander of Macedon, 356–323 B.C.: A Historical Biography* (London and New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971, repr. 1991); and N.G.L. Hammond, *Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman*, 2nd ed. (Park Ridge, N.J.: Noyes Press, 1989) for modern studies of the topic, with extensive bibliographies.

2. For Greek warfare in the classical period, see especially F.E. Adcock, *The Greek and Macedonian Art of War* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1957); V.D. Hanson, *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece* (Pisa: Giardini, 1983) and *The Western Way of War* (London and New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989); and A. Ferrill, *The Origins of War* (London and New York: Thames & Hudson, 1987).

3. On the status of hoplites, see A.J. Holladay, "Hoplites and Heresies," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (hereafter *JHS*), no. 102, 1982, pp. 94–103. See also V.D. Hanson, ed., *Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991).

4. See J.P. Best, *Thracian Peltasts and Their Influence on Greek Warfare* (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1969), on peltasts; cf. Agis at Decelea on fortified positions.

5. For recent full studies of Agesilaus, see P.A. Cartledge, *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1987) and C.D. Hamilton, *Agesilaos and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony* (Ithaca, N.Y., and London: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991).

6. Whatever the precise composition of the force commanded by King Agis at Decelea (cf. Thucydides, 7.19.2), it appears *not* to have consisted of mercenaries. The same is not true of naval commanders, e.g. Lysander, in the Aegean in the Ionian phase of the Peloponnesian War (cf. Xenophon, *Hellenica* [hereafter *Xen. Hell.*], 1.5.3–4).

[The standard practice among scholars of classical history is to cite author, title, book, chapter, and section, omitting the book (here, after first mention) if the author wrote only one; thus Thucydides, 7.19.2. Such citations are to the original Greek texts, usually available in the Loeb Classical Library series, published by the Harvard University Press. In addition there are modern English translations of many, but not all, of the Greek and Latin authors; the practice (since translations vary) is not to cite a particular page reference, unless the translation is being quoted—*Ed.*]

7. The remarks of V.J. Gray, in "Two Different Approaches to the Battle of Sardis in 395 B.C.: Xenophon *Hellenica* 3.4.20–4 and *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 11 (6) 4–6," *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* (hereafter *CSCA*), no. 12, 1979, pp. 183–200 at p. 187, seem apposite here: "His [i.e. Xenophon's] most apparent purpose in writing history was to present paradigms of the good commander, and a most essential aspect of the art of command is to make your soldiers fit, skilled, keen and loyal." Agesilaus was a particular hero in Xenophon's account of Greek history, and he was portrayed as possessing such qualities of a commander.

8. Herodotus, 7.220 ff., and see the epigram for the fallen Spartans:

*Go, stranger, and tell them at Sparta,
That we lie here, obedient to their command.*

Even those commanders who led forces of helots or *neodamodeis* during the Peloponnesian War seem not to have had difficulty on this score. (Cf. the campaigns of Brasidas in the Thracian region in the 420s described in Thucydides, 4.78–80.) The status of the *neodamodeis* is a matter of scholarly debate, but most agree

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that they were helots who had been liberated and were thereafter employed as soldiers by the Spartans. King Agis did encounter serious opposition from his troops because of his conduct in the Argolid in 418; the problem, however, was not that they would not march into battle but that the king had avoided an engagement and so provoked their anger. On the political implications of this incident, see D. Kagan, "Argive Politics and Policy after the Peace of Nicias," *American Journal of Philology* (hereafter *AJP*), no. 81, 1962, pp. 209–18.

9. Xen. *Hell.*, 3.4.2; cf. 3.1.4–6 and 8. For a modern analysis of his force, see H. Lins, *Kritische Betrachtung der Feldzüge des Agesilaus in Kleinasien* (Halle: Hohmann, 1914).

10. Indeed, his modest and frugal habits provoked both consternation and derision from those in Egypt whom he went to serve as a mercenary general in his last years. Plutarch, *Agesilaus* [hereafter *Ages.*], 36.3–4.

11. Xen. *Hell.*, 3.4.12 and 4.1.20–7; Plutarch (*Ages.*, 19.3) says that the tithe alone of the spoils taken in the Asiatic campaign amounted to a hundred talents. J. Ober, *Fortress Attica: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier, 404–322 B.C.* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), pp. 39–40, stresses Agesilaus's awareness of the economic aspect of warfare, especially in his campaigns in the Corinthian territory and in Acarnania in 389–388. Also see W.K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1974), part II, chap. V, "Profits of Generals," for a full discussion of plunder and booty and their disposition in this period. Immediately after the battle of Sardis, when his peltasts had begun to plunder the enemy camp, Agesilaus surrounded the camp with his hoplites to prevent the peltasts from carrying off more than their fair share of the booty. (Xen. *Hell.*, 3.4.24.)

12. Gray, "Battle of Sardis," p. 190.

13. Xen. *Hell.*, 3.4.15–8; and *Ages.*, 1.23–4.

14. Xenophon, *Ages.*, 6.5–6, speaks in general terms of Agesilaus's skill in the use of such tactics, praising even the use of deception when it seemed necessary and useful. On the use of deception by Spartans, see A. Powell, "Mendacity and Sparta's Use of the Visual," in A. Powell, ed., *Classical Sparta: Techniques behind Her Success* (London and Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1989), pp. 173–92.

15. Xenophon, *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (hereafter *Hell. Oxy.*), 21.1–2. See the discussion by Pritchett, vol. II, chap. IX, "Ambuscades," on the topic in general. This same tactic of ambush may already have been used to good effect by Agesilaus in an earlier encounter against the satrap Tissaphernes, but on a level plain. (*Hell. Oxy.*, 11.2–3.)

16. *Hell. Oxy.*, 21–2. Xen. *Hell.*, 3.4.13 and 4.4.1, contains assertions, however, that Agesilaus was successful occasionally in taking cities by force. Since few specific examples are given, I think that my judgment is, in the main, correct on his deficiency in this area.

17. Arrian, *Anabasis of Alexander*, 2.18 ff; Plutarch, *Demetrius*, 20 and 27. On siegecraft, see Adcock, pp. 56–63, and A.W. Lawrence, *Greek Aims in Fortification* (London and New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979). The fourth-century tract by Aeneas Tacticus, *On Siegecraft*, is also instructive in this regard.

18. On Iphicrates, see C.D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca, N.Y., and London: Cornell Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 281–2; and H.W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (London and New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1933), pp. 50–7 and 77–83. On the Theban generals, see J. Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 63–4 and 110–29.

19. See U. Kahrstedt, *Real-encyclopaedie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, s.v. "Iphikrates," vol. II, col. 2021, for full references.

20. See Adcock, pp. 20–4; Best, pp. 85–97; and J.K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1970), pp. 121–31, for discussions of his military innovations.

21. Parke, pp. 17–8.

22. Nepos, *Iphicrates*, 1.2.

23. Xen. *Hell.*, 4.4.16–7.

24. *Ibid.*, 4.5.11–18; Anderson, pp. 121–31.

25. For Leuctra, see Anderson, chap. X, "The Battle of Leuctra," pp. 192–220; Buckler, *Theban Hegemony*, "Leuktra"; G.L. Cawkwell, "The Decline of Sparta," *Classical Quarterly* (hereafter *CQ*), vol. 33, 1983, pp. 385–400, at pp. 397–9; J.F. Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (Warminster, U.K.: Aris and Phillips, 1985), pp. 151–62; Buckler, "Plutarch on Leuktra," *Symbolae Osloenses*, vol. 55, 1980, pp. 75–93; C.J. Tuplin, "The Leuctra Campaign: Some Outstanding Problems," *Klio*, vol. 69, 1987, pp. 72–107; and V.D. Hanson, "Epameinondas, the Battle of Leuktra (371 B.C.), and the 'Revolution' in Greek Battle Tactics," *Classical Antiquity* (hereafter *CA*), vol. 7, 1988, pp. 190–207.

The anomaly of the dual kingship in Sparta, where the principal function of the monarch was to lead in warfare, had been addressed in 506 B.C. Thereafter only one king served on any given campaign.

26. Xen. *Hell.*, 6.4.6; Diodorus, *Historical Library*, 15.53.3; and Pausanias, *Description of Greece*, 9.13.6–7 (where the names of the seven Boeotarchs are recorded); Plutarch, *Pelopidas* [hereafter *Pelop.*], 20.2.

27. Xen. *Hell.*, 6.4.5. Interestingly, only Xenophon comments on the political tensions within the Spartan camp, while he fails to note the initial division among the Boeotarchs, which the other sources record. No

doubt the explanation of these divergences lies in the fundamental sources employed by these writers; Xenophon's information came from the Spartan side, while Diodorus's, Plutarch's, and Pausanias's was from a Boeotian source, or at least one more interested in the Theban point of view, possibly Ephorus. For an excellent discussion of the possible sources of information of these writers (although on another topic), see the valuable study of H.D. Westlake, "The Sources for the Spartan Debauch at Haliartus," *Phoenix*, vol. 39, 1985, pp. 119-33.

28. Xen. *Hell.*, 6.4.12; and Plutarch, *Pelop.*, 23.1.

29. This was a tactic they had employed as early as the battle of Delium in 424, as well as at the Nemea and probably at Coroneia and Tegyra also. See Lazenby, p. 156.

30. Anderson, p. 217, places the Sacred Band behind the phalanx. Lazenby's conclusion (p. 157) seems much more likely: "It makes much more sense of what Plutarch says about Pelopidas and his command if the Sacred Band was stationed somewhere in the front of the Theban phalanx, and perhaps it made up the front three or four ranks of the whole phalanx, forming in a very real sense its 'cutting edge.'"

31. Xen. *Hell.*, 6.4.10.

32. Xen. *Hell.*, 6.4.10-11, 13; and Plutarch, *Pelop.*, 23.1.

33. See Anderson, p. 216, and Lazenby, pp. 158-9, for this view.

34. Anderson, pp. 218-9, and Lazenby, pp. 158-9.

35. Xen. *Hell.*, 6.4.13-14; Plutarch, *Pelop.*, 23.1-4; Diodorus, 15.55.4-56.2; and Pausanias, 9.13.9-10.

36. Xenophon (6.4.14-5) describes the orderly retreat of the Spartans to their camp after their defeat; Diodorus (15.56.2-3) describes a panicked flight and a hot pursuit by Epaminondas. Xenophon's account is probably to be preferred here, as derived from an eyewitness (albeit a Spartan).

37. Xen. *Hell.*, 6.4.15; Pausanias, 9.13.11-12; and Diodorus, 15.56.4. The last relates the impossible figure of more than four thousand Spartan dead. The allied casualties were light—not surprisingly, since their part in the action was minimal.

38. Diodorus (15.56.4) mentions "about three hundred" Theban dead; Pausanias (9.13.12) claims, rather precisely, that only forty-seven died among the Thebans and loyal Boeotians. Xenophon and Plutarch give no figures for Theban casualties. See M.N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (London and New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1948), vol. 2, no. 130, for an inscription honoring several victorious Theban leaders on this occasion; cf. H. Beister, *Chiron*, vol. 3, 1973, pp. 65-84.



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(signed) Pelham G. Boyer, Managing Editor